For a zero-sum stochastic game which does not satisfy the Isaacs condition, we provide a value function representation for an Isaacs-type equation whose Hamiltonian lies in between the lower and upper Hamiltonians, as a convex combination of the two. For the general case (i.e. the convex combination is time and state dependent) our representation amounts to a random change of the rules of the game, to allow each player at any moment to see the other player's action or not, according to a coin toss with probabilities of heads and tails given by the convex combination appearing in the PDE. If the combination is state independent, then the rules can be set all in advance, in a deterministic way. This means that tossing the coin along the game, or tossing it repeatedly right at the beginning leads to the same value. The representations are asymptotic, over time discretizations. Space discretization is possible as well, leading to similar results.
Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic games of the type 
where the state system is controlled by two opponents u and v as dX t = b(t, X t , u t , v t )dt + σ(t, X t , u t , v t )dW t ,
have been studied extensively. We recall quickly that the above game is set so that player v pays g(x) to the player u at terminal time T , if the state sits at x at time t = T . We mention just a few representative pieces of work on such zero-sum differential games: the seminal work of Isaacs on deterministic games [Isa65] , some of the early work on stochastic games like [Ell76] , and the extensive contribution of the Ekaterinburg school of games (mostly deterministic and some stochastic) presented in the monograph [KS88] . The list is much larger and we do not claim to cover it here.
It is well known that a (heuristic) dynamic programming approach to such zero sum games leads to the so-called Isaacs equations:
where H − (t, x, p, M ) sup (5) For i = − we call it the lower Isaacs equation, and for i = + we call it the upper Isaacs equation. The precise definition of the games varies in the literature (as there is no canonical model), from the Elliott-Kalton formulation in [FS89] to the feedback formulation in [KS88] which is used in similar ways in [FHH11] , [FHH12] , [S14] or [S15] . However, in any of these formulations, the intuition behind the (solution of the) lower equation is that player v has informational priority over u . By informational priority we mean that v can see, in real time, the action of u before choosing his/her own action v. The upper Isaacs equation has, obviously, the exact opposite meaning. If the so-called Isaacs condition holds, i.e.
it does not matter who has informational priority. Even if both players can (symmetrically) only observe the state and nothing else, the game still have a value (see [S14] ).
The main goal of the present paper is to provide a meaningful interpretation/representation for the (unique viscosity) solution of the equation
where H p (t, x, p, M ) = p(t, x)H − (t, x, p, M ) + (1 − p(t, x))H + (t, . This means that we are looking for a model of rules of the game and strategies such that the resulting game has a value and the value is equal to the solution of (6). In order to model the strategies of the players we follow here the line of work [KS88] , [FHH11] , [FHH12] , [S14] or [S15] that uses feedback strategies, rather than the idea of Elliott-Kalton strategies in [EK72] , [FS89] . The Rules of the Game: in words, the (heuristic) rules of a game with value v p are Remark 1.1, as well as the heuristic rules of the game described above, are all justified by the very simple one-period observation in Subsection 1.1 below. The rest of the paper is dedicated to putting the game with such rules on sound theoretical foundation, and proving the (asymptotic) value property. When the coin toss does not depend on the state, we actually have a deterministic approximation, in the spirit of [KS05] . The heuristic connection between the two cases, the random rule of priority or the (quick) deterministic change for the rule of priority, fits in the well known narrative where, in a continuous-time problem, one can basically simulate randomization from the realization of a single path. Since the technical proofs for the deterministic case are a little bit more involved, we present this result (and its proof) first. Technically, the proofs are mainly based on a modification of Perron's method introduced in [S15] . It should be noted that while Perron scheme is related to the monotone scheme of [BS91] (related in turn to the method of relaxed semi-limits of [BP87] ), the version of Perron used here is based on probabilistic arguments.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper studying a similar representation problem so far is the work [KS05] , for deterministic games. For the case when the problem is autonomous with respect to time and p is a constant (probability) they use a Trotter-Kato approximation idea to show the following: if one denotes by S − (t) and S + (t) the non-linear (Nisio-type, see [Nis88] ) semigroups associated with the two games, i.e. v − (t, ·) = S − (T − t)g and v + (t, ·) = S + (T − t)g are (the viscosity) solutions of the two Isaacs equations (3) for i = − and i = + given by [FS89] , then we have the (analytic) result
The right-hand side above might be interpreted as a time-discretized game, but the precise definition of a game with such a value is actually not necessarily possible. Therefore, the result is mostly an analytical asymptotic representation. In addition, the semigroups S − and S + are constructed in [FS89] using non-symmetric games which play Elliott-Kalton strategies vs. open-loop controls, introduced for the deterministic framework in [EK72] . As observed in [S15][Remark 2.1], these definitions do not always have the genuine meaning of some values of non symmetric games. This is why it may not be possible to rewrite the right-hand-side in (7) as an inf/sup or sup/inf. While our work below in Subsection 2.1 is, obviously, related to [KS05] , it does not really overlap, either conceptually or technically. To begin with, for us v p is a limit of a genuine (sup/inf or inf/sup) value of a game, discretized over time (compare to the comments above). Our state system is time dependent, and, more importantly, we allow for the probability p to be non-constant. The time discretization we use is different, as we do not allow for actions to be changed in between the times on the grid, and the time grid does not have to be as in [KS05] but only satisfy what we call an asymptotic density property. This relates to the possibility of randomization of rules (as in the general Subsection 2.2) but where randomization of rules is performed in advance.
Most importantly, our most general result in Subsection 2.2 provides a completely different conceptual point of view, as a game with random rules, were a time and state dependent coin is tossed to decide which player has priority. Such a result, even at a formal level, does not exist in the literature, to the best of our knowledge, even in the deterministic case.
Technically, our work (both parts) is rather different from [KS05] , being based on a Perron scheme introduced in [S15] . One of the benefits is that we do not need to assume any prior results from the theory of zero-sum games (the results in [FS89] are used in [KS05] ), but we can build the whole model and perform the analysis in a self-contained way.
One-period games with random rules
In the general case of Subsection 2.2, our dynamic game will be played using locally a simple idea that is best explained in one-period. This is easy enough so that genuine proofs are unnecessary. The notation u, v for the actions of the players overlaps with the dynamic case, but this is on purpose, to facilitate the presentation.
Assume we have a (bounded) function f : U × V → R and we define
We can assign to f − the meaning of a true value/saddle point for the game where v sees u and similarly for f + . More precisely, if we denote by β the possible responses for v that sees u, i.e. functions β : U → V then
Similarly, if u sees the action of v, considering all maps α : V → U then
In the spirit of the work on dynamic games by Krasovskii-Subbotin [KS88] we call α and β above "counter-strategies" in this static game. Obviously, the saddle points above (if they exist) are found by solving a sequential optimization problem, i.e. finding (for f − , for example) first
We similarly find α * and v * for f + (if they exist, if not, we can find them approximately). Now, the interpretation of f This can also be thought of as: prior to the coin toss, player u chooses a pair (u, α) and player v chooses a pair (v, β). Then 1. if H shows up then u is played against β 2. if T shows up, then α is played against v.
In other words, we have the quite obvious representation
In addition, the pairs (u * , α * ) and (v * , β * ) found above (again, if such pairs exist, if not they exist in an approximate sense) represent a saddle point for the game with value f p . Once again, the general dynamic game with a value v p in Subsection 2.2 will be played using this idea continuously at any time t.
Set-up and main results
We now turn to the precise conditions on the state equation and pay-off, and leave the precise definition of the probability space, as well as strategies for slightly later. We have here a differential game with two players. The first player's actions belong to the compact metric space (U, d u ) (usually U ⊂ R k ). The second player's actions belong also to a compact metric space (V, d v ). We assume that the state belongs to
′ of the state equations satisfy some usual assumptions (see [S14] or [S15] ).
Assumptions on the state system: b and σ are
2. uniformly locally Lipschitz in the state variable, i.e. for each K < ∞ there exists L(K) < ∞ such that
3. have linear growth, i.e. there exists C < ∞ such that
In addition, we have the following Assumption on the pay-off: the function g : R d → R is continuous and bounded.
The state of the system is governed by equation (2), if the game starts at an initial time s at some position x. In order to obtain the desired representation for the solution of the Isaacs-type equation (6), we will allow, as mentioned in the introduction, for changes of rules of the game, as time evolves. We do so by discretizing time. State discretization is also possible. For a fixed 0 ≤ s ≤ T , we will usually denote by ∆ a time partition 
Deterministic rules of priority: state-independent intermediate Hamiltonians
Fix (s, x). Assume here that the process W is a d ′ -dimensional Brownian motion on a fixed probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) s≤t≤T , P) (which can, actually, depend on (s, x)). The filtration (F t ) s≤t≤T satisfies the usual conditions and may be larger than the natural filtration
Together with this partition we have a sequence ξ = ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n of "marks" valued as 0 or 1. We denote by M(∆) the collection of all possible sequence of marks (note that we have as many marks as time intervals in the partition).
The rules of the game are set, deterministically, in advance, and the players cannot change actions in between the discrete times on ∆. If the mark ξ k is equal to zero, then, on the interval [t k−1 , t k ] player u first sees player v's action, i.e player u chooses (over this time interval) some α "counterstrategy " depending on 1. the whole past of the state up to t k−1
current value of the other players' action
The other player only choose a strategy b depending on the past of the state, up to t k−1 . In other words, if ξ k = 0 the first player u uses over
. If ξ k = 1 then the roles are reversed, and player u uses a strategy a k (X| 0,t k−1 ] ) while player v uses a counter-strategy β k (X| [0,t k−1 ] , v). These can all me bade "Markov" (with some special care) or general dependent on the whole past, or may even depend, explicitly, on the actions of the opposing player over the intervals [t 0 , t 1 ], . . . [t k−1 , t k−1 ]. The marks are deterministic, i.e. are known in advance when the game is started. With these rules, we can define a value of the game, depending on the partition and the marks ξ = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ). Before that, for a fixed s, we denote by C[s, T ] the set of continuous paths C([s, T ] : R d ). A generic path will be denoted by y or y(·). We also denote by B t the raw filtration generated by the paths up to time t, i.e. B t = σ{y(u) : s ≤ u ≤ t}.
Definition 2.1 (Discrete strategies, deterministic change of rules) Fix s, together with the time partition ∆ ∈ D(s) and the deterministic change of rules ξ ∈ M(∆).
A full strategy for the player u is a sequence
We denote by A s,∆,ξ the set of these strategies. Player u chooses the action u k at time t k−1 and holds it until t k . This depends on the whole past of the state up to t k−1 , the actions v 1 , . . . , v k−1 of the opponent on the intervals [t 0 , t 1 ], . . . , [t k−2 , t k−1 ] and, depending on the mark ξ k on the value v k or not.
2. A feedback strategy for the first player is a sequence
where
The meaning is again clear. We denote by A s,∆,ξ F the set of these strategies 3. Markov strategy for the first player: the definition here is a little bit different, because we allow for the player to change actions fewer times than the marks change. More precisely, for the fixed ∆ : t 0 < . . . t n = T we assume that there is a sub-grid
such that, at any of these times r i−1 = t l(i−1) , the player chooses a pair
measurable and holds the action decided based on where the state is at time r i−1 = t l(i−1) until the next time on the sub-grid, i.e. r i = t l (i). The marks may change in between r i−1 and r i but the action of player u only changes if the mark is ξ k = 0 and the action of the opponent changes. In other words, fixed the double sequence
, the actions of player u can be represented as a strategy in item 1 (with some abuse of notation) by
We denote by A s,∆,ξ M the set of these strategies.
We have
The first inclusion may not seem obvious, but, at a second glance, it is clear that dependence on older past is OK. We define in a similar manner (but symmetrically opposite, depending on the value of the marks) the (sets of) strategies for the player v, B
In the definition of strategies v the role of the value of the marks ξ is reversed, in an obvious way.
There exists a unique strong solution of the state system (2), denoted by (X s,x;u,v t ) s≤t≤T , such that
Proof: the proof is done step-by-step over intervals [t k−1 , t k ] as in [KS88] or [S14] . Actually, since the initial condition is deterministic, the (uniform) linear growth condition insures that the solution is square integrable. ⋄ With the notation J(s, x, ∆, ξ; u, v) E g X s,x;u,v T
, we can now define the value functions:
In the chain of inequalities above we could have defined an additional intermediate layer of value functions, playing Markov strategies vs. feedback strategies. Next theorem is a (deterministic) asymptotic result, somewhat similar to [KS05] , but different: time intervals are not ordered, and the actions cannot be continuously changed in between the times on the grid. Also, we have a stochastic game for which we find asymptotic values of inf/sup and sup/inf type. , together with marks ξ n,s ∈ M(∆ n,s )) such that (∆ n,s , ξ n,s ) has uniform asymptotic density p. By this, we mean that for any ε > 0 there exists n 0 (ε) (in this formulation we assume that n 0 does not depend on s) large enough, such that for any n ≥ n 0 (ε) we have that, inside the partition
we can find a sub-division
and
Then the Isaacs-type equation (6) has a unique bounded continuous viscosity solution v, which is the limit (uniform on compacts sets) of both V − M (·, ·; ∆ n,· , ξ n,· ) and V + M (·, ·; ∆ n,· , ξ n,· ). More precisely, for any K < ∞ and ε > 0, there exists n 0 = n(K, ε) such that ∀s, ∀|x| ≤ K, ∀n ≥ n 0 ,
Random rules of priority: state-dependent intermediate Hamiltonians
We study here the general case, where the players play, locally, a game with random rules described in Subsection 1.1. Assume that the convex combination parameter is a continuous function
Fix the initial time s. The process W is a d ′ -dimensional Brownian motion on the fixed filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) s≤t≤T P). The filtration satisfies the usual conditions. In order to perform independent coin tosses, we assume that the space Ω accommodates the (infinite) sequence of independent standard normals η = (η k ) k=1,2,... .
They are independent of the Brownian motion, and, since W comes with a possibly larger filtration, we actually assume that, under P, the whole sequence η is independent of F T (and is i.i.d normal, as mentioned). We denote by Φ the c.d.f. of a standard normal, so that, for each η k above we have
Fix now the initial position x. Fix, in addition, as above, a partition ∆ of the time interval. The game is discretised in time over ∆ and the rules are decided by the realisations of the first η i 's (as many as time intervals). Instead of considering an infinite sequence of i.i.d. normals, one could even assume that the probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) s≤t≤T , P), the Brownian motion W and the first n coin tosses η 1 , ...η n actually depend on (s, x) and ∆. We could also consider directly a sequence of i.i.d. uniform on (0, 1) instead of (Φ −1 (η k )) k=1,2,... . Main rules of the game:
1. Random priority: at each time t k−1 on the grid, depending on where the state X t k−1 is located, a coin is tossed with probability p(t k−1 , X t k−1 ) and then players u, v choose their actions with a priority rule described in the Subsection 1.1 of the Introduction. The coin toss is simulated using the binary random variable
so the value of η k decides which player has priority over the interval [t k−1 , t k ].
2. No action outside the grid: the controls chosen at t k−1 have to be kept constant until the next time on the grid, t k .
This means that, at time t k−1 player u chooses a couple (u k , α k ) and player v chooses (v k , β k ), as in Subsection 1.1 of the Introduction.
The set-up of the game has to also take into account the additional (to the coin toss) information that the two players have at time t k−1 , in order to choose the two couples (u k , α k ), (v k , β k ). Therefore, we need the Additional informational structure: there are three symmetric possibilities where (both) players 1. at time t k−1 can see the whole past of the state up to that time and all controls used by the opposing player in the past, 2. at time t k−1 can see the past of the state up to time t k−1 , but not the past controls,
We use the same notation for C[s, T ] as the set of continuous paths C([s, T ] : R d ), generic paths are y y or y(·) and B t is the raw filtration generated by the paths up to time t, i.e. B t = σ{y(u) : s ≤ u ≤ t}.
Definition 2.4 (Discrete strategies) Fix s and ∆ ∈ D(s) where ∆ is given as s = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n = T for some n.
1. A full strategy for the first player is a sequence
In words, the k-th decision of player u made at time t k−1 depends on the history of the state process up to t k−1 , and history of the actions of v over intervals
, as well as the k coin toss. We denote by A s,∆ the set of these strategies.
In words, this is a strategy as above but the history of the actions of v over intervals [t 0 , t 1 ], ....[t k−2 , t k−1 ] is not taken into account (explicitly) for the k'th decision of player u at time t k−1 . We denote by A s,∆ F the set of these strategies 3. A Markov strategy for the first player is a sequence
In this case, the decision k'th of player u, made at time t k−1 , depends only on the position X t k−1 ∈ R d , and, depending on how the k ′ th toss turns up, the other opponent's action at time t k−1 or not. We denote by A s,∆ M the set of these strategies.
We define in an identical manner similar (sets of) strategies for the player v,
Remark 2.5 The time-discretization, together with the assumption that actions of the players are kept constant in between the times on the grid ∆ allow for a simple definition of full strategies. In our previous work [S14] and [S15], we only used the idea of feedback strategies (or counterstrategies). However, it is well know from discrete-time game theory, that the idea of full strategy should not lead to different value. We consider it here for completeness. From the intuition point of view, it appears also rather clear that observing the full past of the state allows one to recover all the information needed about the past controls of the opponent. The really important piece of information is the control of the opponent in real time at the time of a possible change (on the grid). Modelling precisely how this is decided randomly is the goal of the paper.
Proposition 2.6 Fix s, x, ∆. Fix u ∈ A s,∆ , v ∈ B s,∆ . There exists a unique strong solution of the state system (2), denoted by (X s,x;u,v t ) s≤t≤T , such that
Proof: the proof is based, again, on the "step-by-step" scheme as in [KS88] . In other words, one solves the system, iteratively over intervals [t k−1 , t k ], noticing that the realization of the strategies (a k , α k ) and (b k , β k ) at time t k−1 are kept constant over [t k−1 , t k ]. The only additional thing needed is the coin toss η k , which is independent of W . ⋄ With the notation J(s, x; u, v) E g X s,x;u,v T
, we define the value functions:
Again, we could have considered above an additional intermediate layer of value functions, playing Markov strategies vs. feedback strategies.
Remark 2.7 One could prove directly that the game with discretely restricted strategies (either full, or feedback, or Markov) has a value. In other words, we could directly show that (for the more extreme
. This would be rather long technically, and does not bring much understanding into the continuous limit we care about, but it is certainly doable. The same goes true for the previous Subsection 2.1.
The main result of the paper, in the general case is: 
Proofs
As mentioned, the proofs are based on a modification of Perron's method introduced in [S15] . However, the analysis has to be done separately for Subsections 2.1 and 2.2. The proofs for the random case in Subsection 2.2 are actually easier, so we will present them more succinctly. The notations and definitions needed for the proofs will refer to the corresponding sub-section. More precisely, we are going to call semi-solutions two different objects in Subsection 2.1 and in Subsection 2.2.
Perron method for deterministic rule of priority
We start by defining asymptotic stochastic sub and super-solutions for the problem at hand. Before we do that, we need to concatenate strategies (at least the simplest of them, Markov strategies).
where the marks ξ ′ are the restriction of the sequence of marks ξ over the interval [t k , T ], i.e.
We define the concatenation of v and v ′ at time t k over ∆, ξ by using v up to t k and v ′ after that. In other words, we define
..,n , where
Note that this fits the definition of Markov strategies, if the point t k is considered as a part of the subgrid (r i ) i=1,...,I(n) . The definitions of asymptotic sub and super-solutions below need many quantifiers, but the intuition behind them is rather clear. Denote by U the class of asymptotic super-solutions. Comparing this to the definition of Markov strategies, we see that (b w , β w ) are chosen at t k and not changed until t n . Only the marks change after t k .
Lemma 3.3 Given w ∈ U , if (∆ n,s , ξ n,s ) has uniform asymptotic density p (see the statement of Theorem 2.3), then w(s, x) ≥ lim sup
uniformly in (s, x). More precisely, for any ε > 0 there exists n 0 (ε) such that
Proof: Fix the initial conditions s, x and ε > 0. For n ≥ n 0 (ε) we have that, inside the partition
Using the definition of super-solution recursively for times t k = t l(i−1) = r i−1 , i = 1, . . . , I(n)) on the sub-grid, we construct av from time s to time T by concatenating the constant strategies (b i w , β i w ) (corresponding to time r i−1 ) over the interval [r i−1 , r i ] = [t l(i−1) , t l(i) ] (remember marks may change over this interval) such that, in the end,
l(i).
Note that the strategyv is a Markov strategy. Implementing this strategyv against any strategy u of the player u yields, according to the very definition of super-solution applied, successively, for i = 1, ....I(n) to the inequalities
Since w(T, x) ≥ g(x), we conclude that
for all u, if n ≥ n 0 (ε), finishing the proof of the lemma. ♦ The proof of the next lemma is not obvious but its proof is very similar to the corresponding result in [S15] .
Next proposition is the main technical result of the section. Before it is presented, notice the obvious fact that U = ∅, because the cost function g is bounded.
Then v + is a USC viscosity sub-solution of the Isaacs equation (6).
Proof: To begin with, we use [BS12, Proposition 4.1] together with the previous Lemma 3.4 above to conclude that there exist a countable sequence w n ∈ U such that w n ց v + . We need to treat separately the (parabolic) interior viscosity sub-solution property for v + and the terminal condition v + (T, ·) ≤ g (which is, actually, a equality).
1. Interior sub-solution property: Consider a smooth function ψ which touches v + locally strictly above at some
With the notation
this means that there exists ab ∈ V as well asβ : U → V such that
We make the additional notation
and use continuity of p to consider an even smaller ε > 0 such that
We use continuity once again to find some ε ′ > 0 depending on ε such that
Since ψ touches locally v + strictly above, ψ s continuous and v + is USC, we can find an even smaller ε ′ > 0 and a δ > 0 small enough such that
Now, a Dini type argument, identical to the one used in [BS14] and [BS13] implies that, for some n large enough we actually have
Now let η < δ and define
Using
In order to do this, fix 0 ≤ s ≤ T , a ∆ ∈ D(s) and some t k ∈ ∆. For this time t k , we define
as well as
For any fixed sequence of marks ξ ∈ M(∆), fix a u ∈ A s,∆,ξ . Denote bŷ
Now, the proof goes very similarly to the proof in [S15] . Recall that we have to make all estimates at time t k . On the event where the the initial condition where w n lies below ψ − η at time t k ,
equation (11) is satisfied with ϕ = ϕ wn and C = C wn , i.e. for any later t l ∈ ∆, t k < t l we have
For the other possibilities, i.e. over the event
we have, with the additional notation
uniformly (over all u and all else that matters), for some gauge function ϕ. The proof is similar to [S15] . On the other hand, over A we can apply Itô. On this event, for any subinterval [t i−1 , t i ] (i = k + 1, . . . , l) we have 2 possible cases:
1. either ξ i = 1, in which case we use the strategy of u against the counterstrategyβ 2. or ξ i = 0, when we use a counterstrategy for u agains the constantb. After Itô and taking conditional expectation, we get,
On A ∩ B we have estimates on the generator L, so 1. v − = v + = v the continuous viscosity solution to the Isaacs equation (6). This is the consequence of a comparison result whose proof is identical to the result in [S14] (first a reduction to a bounded comparison result, then a limit) once we observe that the (time dependent) linear combination
satisfies (locally in x) the structural condition (3.14) in [CIL92] , needed for comparison. Note that both Hamiltonians H − and H + satisfy such condition (this is proved in [CIL92, page 19] ) and overviewed in [S14] . One has to take care of the appropriate sign for H to get exactly condition (3.14) in [CIL92] .
2. we can extract a sequence w n ց v ∈ U and, therefore, by Dini's criterion (since w n and v are continuous) we have that the convergence is uniform on compacts.
3. we can make an identical argument for sub-solutions v n ր v uniform on compacts, 4. we use relation (12) for a super-solution w n , and its counterpart for a sub-solution v n such that w n and v n are close apart on compacts (from item 2, 3 above, such exist) to obtain the conclusion (9).
Perron method for random rules of priority
We basically have to re-define all objects in Subsection 3.1 and go over similar proofs. The arguments will, therefore, be a bit repetitive. For this reason, we present them in less detail. However, care must be taken to account for the randomisation of rules of priority. All notation is considered in the context of the model in Subsection 2.2. 
such that the Markov strategy for the v player defined byv = v(r) = (b w ,β w ) played at time r and kept constant until T against any u = (a, α) and following any prior strategy v up to time r has an asymptotic super-martingale property (until the next time on the grid).
More precisely, ∀∆ ∈ D(s) such that r = t k ∈ ∆, for any v ∈ B s,∆ M and any u ∈ A s,∆ , if we make the notationX · X s,x,u,v⊗t kv · , then the "local asymptotic super-martingale property"
holds.
Denote by U the class of asymptotic super-solutions.
In the definition above we implicitly used a rather obvious notation for the concatenation of Markov strategies.
Remark 3.8 We recall that the priority rule at time r = t k is decided by the coin toss η k+1 and actions are kept constant up to t k+1 . At time t k , after the coin is tossed, the actions of both players are decided and kept constant until time t k+1 . Therefore, the processX satisfies the integral equation
Abusing notation we say that
. Taking the expectation with respect tot the coin toss η k+1 , the "local asymptotic super-martingale property", written in between consecutive times t k and t k+1 becomes
We prefer to average out the coin toss η k+1 because, since can write Itô formula and identify easy the generator.
Lemma 3.9 Let w ∈ U . Then w(s, x) ≥ lim sup
uniformly in (s, x). More precisely, for any ε > 0 there exists δ 0 (ε) such that
Proof: The proof is actually easier for this case, compared to Subsection 3.1, and very much similar to [S15] . Fix s, x. Fix ε > 0. For some δ 0 (ε) we have T × ϕ w (δ) ≤ ε for δ ≤ δ 0 (ε). Fix a partition such that ∆ ≤ δ 0 (ε). We use the definition of asymptotic super-solution to construct, recursively, over [t k , t k+1 ] theb k+1 ,β k+1 the strategy for player v
Use this strategyv against any strategy u of the player u and keep the notationX for the resulting state process. Iterating (17) for t k = t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n−1 and applying it to up to t k+1 = t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n we obtain
Summing the telescoping terms, since w(T, x) ≥ g(x), we conclude that w(s,
The proof of the next lemma is again very similar to a corresponding result in [S15] .
Lemma 3.10 The set of asymptotic super-solutions with random rules is closed under minimum, i.e.
Again, U = ∅, because the cost function g is bounded.
Proof: Use [BS12, Proposition 4.1] and Lemma 3.10 to find a sequence w n ∈ U such that w n ց v + . We again treat separately the (parabolic) interior viscosity sub-solution property for v + and the terminal condition v + (T, ·) ≤ g (equality).
1. Interior sub-solution property: Consider a smooth function ψ which touches locally v + strictly above at some (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ [0, T ) × R d , and assume that
With the same notation for L t,x,u,v , this means that there exists ab ∈ V as well asβ : U → V such that
Now we use continuity to find some smaller ε > 0 such that p(r, y) ψ t (t, x) + sup u∈U L t,x,u,β(u) ψ + (1 − p(r, y)) ψ t (t
∀|t − t 0 |, |x − x 0 |, |r − t 0 |, |t ′ − t 0 |, |x ′ − x 0 | ≤ 2ε. Since the function ψ touches locally v + strictly above, ψ is continuous and v + is USC, we can find an even smaller ε > 0 and a δ > 0 small enough such that ψ(t, x) − v + (t, x) ≥ 2δ for ε ≤ |t − t 0 | ∨ |x − x 0 | ≤ 2ε.
The same Dini type argument, implies that, for some n large enough we actually have ψ(t, x) − w n (t, x) ≥ δ for ε ′ ≤ |t − t 0 | ∨ |x − x 0 | ≤ 2ε ′ .
Fix η < δ and define w(t, x) (ψ(t, x) − η) ∧ w n (t, x), |t − t 0 | ∨ |x − x 0 | ≤ 2ε ′ w n (t, x), |t − t 0 | ∨ |x − x 0 | > 2ε ′ .
Using (21) we see that w(t, x) = w n (t, x) for |t−t 0 |∨|x−x 0 | ≥ ε ′ and w is continuous everywhere. Since w(t 0 , x 0 ) = v + (t 0 , x 0 ) − η we have a contradiction if we can prove that w ∈ U . We do so next. For the continuous function w, for a fixed s and any s ≤ r ≤ T define b w : R d → V and β w : R d × U → V by b w (x) = b wn (x), w n (r, x) ≤ ψ(t, x) − η, b, w n (r, x) > ψ(t, x) − η, as well as β w (x, u) = β wn (x, u), w n (r, x) ≤ ψ(t, x) − η, β(u), w n (r, x) > ψ(t, x) − η.
Fix s ≤ r ≤ T . Fix also some ∆ ∈ D(s) such that r = t k ∈ ∆ for some k. Fix any u ∈ A s,∆ and any v ∈ B s,∆ M . From here on we use all the notations that one would use to write the Definition (3.7) of for the (potential) super-solution w. If w n lies below ψ − η at time t k = r i.e. on A c = {w n (t k ,X t k ≤ ψ(t k ,X t k ) − η} ∈ F r ∨ σ(η 1 , . . . , η k )
equation (17) is satisfied with ϕ = ϕ wn 1 A c w(t k ,X t k ) =1 A c w n (t k ,X t k )
≥1 A c E[w n (t k+1 ,X t k+1 )|F t k ∨ σ(η 1 , . . . , η k )] − 1 A c (t k+1 − t k )ϕ wn (t k+1 − t k )
≥1
A c E[w(t k+1 ,X t k+1 )|F t k ∨ σ(η 1 , . . . , η k )] − 1 A c (t k+1 − t k )ϕ wn (t k+1 − t k ).
On the event A = {w n (t k ,X t k ) > ψ(t k ,X t k ) − η}, with the additional notation
we can estimate
uniformly over all u, for some gauge function ϕ; cf. [S15] . On the set A we can apply Itô's formula, separately for the two possibilities for the coin toss at time r = t k explicitly represented in Remark 3.8.
1. either Φ −1 (η k+1 ) ≤ p(t k ,X t k ), in which case we use the strategy of u = a k+1 against the counterstrategyβ 2. or Φ −1 (η k+1 ) > t k ,X t k ), when we use a counterstrategy for u = α k+1 agains the constantb. Itô and conditional expectation yields, with the abuse of notation a k+1 = a k+1 (X · ),β =β(a k+1 (X · )), α k+1 = α k+1 (X · ,b), and the additional simplifying notation
On the event A ∩ B we have estimates (20) on the generator L, and also on the probability (conditional) of B c so 1 A S ≤ 0 + CP[B c |F t k ∨ σ(η 1 , . . . , η k )] ≤ 1 A (t k+1 − t k )ϕ(t k+1 − t k ).
On the other hand −1 A E[1 B c ψ η (t k+1 ,X t k+1 ) − w((t k+1 ,X t k+1 ) |F t k ∨σ(η 1 , . . . , η k )] ≤ 1 A C(t k+1 −t k )−ϕ(t k+1 −t k ),
